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ABSTRACT
Suzhou's waterscape, noted for its "small bridges over flowing streams, residences on
canal banks," is a historic relic that the Suzhou government has decided to conserve. In
implementing the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape, the government needs to place
priority on three goals: conservation of the physical environment, improvement of the
water quality in the canals, and maintenance of the quality of life for its residents. The
Suzhou government has instituted different strategies to carry out its conservation
projects and the results have been mixed. The conservation approach traditionally
practiced in China's central-planned economy does not take into account market forces
which have surfaced in China's transitional economy. This thesis proposes that adopting
and modifying government tools generally used in western economies to Suzhou is
necessary to ensure successful conservation of Suzhou's waterscape. In addition, a
formal assessment of government tools should be carried out. Furthermore, constraints
that inhibit the availability of government tools should be relaxed. Finally, this thesis
recommends four conservation approaches specifically targeted to Suzhou's waterscape
and puts forward a new government paradigm in which more non-governmental actors
such as non-profit organizations and private individuals would participate in a democratic
manner and in which social equity would be a core consideration.
Thesis Supervisor: John P de Monchaux
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Over the last 20 years China's economic reform' has transformed its central-planning
economy into a transitional economy which has resulted in many changes in urban
conservation. On the one hand, these economic, political and legislative changes have
contributed significantly to the fast pace of urban redevelopment in historical cities. On
the other hand, these changes have added great complexity to the conservation issues
with which governments must deal in the transitional economy.
Historic canal cities in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces are a case in point. The old city of
Suzhou2 is a typical example of a historic canal city. In the city the government's
approach to conserving its waterscape has proven to be inadequate in the context of the
transitional economy. The traditional waterscape scene noted for its "small bridges over
flowing streams, residences on canal banks" 3 is in danger. In Suzhou's culturally sensitive
historic neighborhoods 4 the government does not have an adequate way of assembling the
proper combination of authority, organizations, resources and personnel to conserve and
rehabilitate its waterscape. These inadequacies have led to decay in the waterscape of the
neighborhoods. Traditional residences, bridges, piers, banks, gates, steps and pavements
need maintenance. The water quality in the canals needs to be improved. Living
1 China's economic reform began in 1979 and is characterized by a reduction of central control over the
economy and introduction of market forces.
2 The city of Suzhou consists of three parts: the old city of Suzhou in the middle, the Singapore Industrial
Park in the east and the High Technology Industry District in the west. This structure is referred to as "one
body and two wings". In this thesis I use Suzhou to refer to the old city of Suzhou.
3 This is the translation of the famous and common Chinese saying to describe Suzhou's waterscape.
4 Culturally sensitive historic neighborhoods are valuable historic neighborhoods in which there are many
historic relics or structures exhibiting local culture. Any small improper changes could harm these cultural
features of the neighborhoods.
conditions in the neighborhoods have become poor. For example, courtyard houses which
were originally designed for extended families now house too many individual
households. Infrastructure enhancements are also necessary. For instance, the current
sewer system drains waste directly into the canals. In less culturally sensitive areas,
luxurious high-density commercial and residential developments have replaced the old
neighborhoods. The majority of older residences have been demolished and low-income
local residents have been relocated to the suburbs. This has incurred great social costs.
These demolished neighborhoods lost their sense of place and identity. Large-scale
transportation projects, realized as a result of the political will of the governors, have
further damaged these neighborhoods.
Although Suzhou's government has carried out some waterscape conservation work, it
has been neither economically feasible nor socially equitable. So far conservation efforts
have focused solely on physical planning. The government has relied on a traditional
command and control hierarchical administration which is dominant in the centrally
planning economy. This approach is now being challenged by the market forces of
China's transitional economy. The concepts of privatization, property rights and equity
have been a puzzle for the government. Considering such circumstances Suzhou's
government has not developed an efficient conservation program.
This thesis will recommend models adopted from market-oriented conservation programs
and put forward a new government paradigm that embraces collaboration between
municipal governments and private institutions. The paradigm will suggest that China
should consider a host of alternative government tools through which governments and
private organizations - both for-profit and nonprofit - can join forces to conserve the
waterscape. The paradigm will be applied to waterscape conservation issues in Suzhou
and in other historic canal cities of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces.
1.2 Research and questions
This thesis I take three points as given:
* The physical "shell 5" of Suzhou's waterscape should be conserved.
" The cultural life attached to the physical "shell" should be conserved.
* The water quality of canals should be improved and maintained.
If all of these goals are achieved, Suzhou's waterscape will be sustainable and effectively
conserved. Suzhou's government has identified the first and third point as essential to the
conservation of the waterscape. However, Suzhou's government places little emphasis on
the second. This is a problem because without a healthy and sustainable living culture
contained in an aesthetic physical shell, the waterscape is meaningless.
The general research question is how can the government conserve Suzhou's waterscape?
This question is divided into three sub-questions:
" How can the physical "shell" of Suzhou's waterscape be conserved?
" How can the cultural and equitable life attached to the physical "shell" be
conserved?
5 The physical "shell" refers to the physical environment into which life is breathed.
e How can the water quality of canals be improved and maintained?
In western countries there is a political science literature that might be called the "tools of
government action" literature. This literature pays careful attention to the tools of
government in the context of an advanced and systematic market. How to adapt and
apply this approach in the context of China's transitional economy is the core of this
thesis. I will focus on the residential waterscape because it is the majority of Suzhou's
waterscape. It is also the most difficult piece of the puzzle for the government and it
affects citizens' interests more deeply than the other types of waterscape.
1.3 Organization of thesis
This thesis consists of six parts. Part one is a brief introduction to Suzhou's conditions,
the research questions and goals. Part two introduces the history, physical features, and
problems of Suzhou's waterscape as well as a series of economic, social and political
issues in urban conservation and redevelopment. Part three presents the current
waterscape conservation work carried out in Suzhou. Four programs have been utilized
by the government. Part four is the identification and evaluation of the government tools
currently applied in the four models. Part five analyzes the economic, political, structural,
and professional capacity constraints of waterscape conservation. By relaxing these
constraints four programs are put forward. Some of these programs would necessitate
partnerships involving the government, non-government organizations, non-profit
organizations, private developers and individuals. Part six is the conclusion in which a
new government paradigm is proposed.
Chapter Two: Suzhou's Waterscape and its Conservation
In this chapter the historic context of Suzhou's waterscape will be introduced and the
elements of the waterscape will be presented. The physical problems of Suzhou's canal
neighborhoods will be analyzed. Economic, social and political forces contributing to
shaping Suzhou's waterscape will be identified.
2.1 A brief history of Suzhou's waterscape
Suzhou is a canal city in the Yangtze Basin of China (Figure 1). It dates back about 2,500
years. Through booms and declines, the city has been famous for its orderly checkerboard
"tartan" grid pattern of canals alternating with streets, and its unique waterscape of "small
bridges over flowing streams with residences on canal banks." Suzhou is also renowned
for its garden villas, silks,
and handcrafted products.6
Figure 1: Location of Suzhou and the
region of rivers and lakes in
Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces
(Tinghai Wu. Study on Urban
Culture. Beijing: PhD. Thesis.
Tsinghua University,1999)
6 Suzhou Chronicle. Jiangsu People's Press. 1995
The waterscape in Suzhou has experienced development, success, and decline. Suzhou
can be traced back to as early as "the three-mountain civilization" of the Paleolithic Age,
10,000 years ago. Judging from the composition of stone instruments, at the time the
Suzhou people lived on fishing and hunting. Canals were constructed rather primitively.
During the "Liangzhu civilization" in the Neolithic Age, productivity improved greatly,
and traces of water conservancy and irrigation from the period can be found in the canal
.7region7.
In 514 B.C, Zixu Wu built a "canal city," which later became the old city of Suzhou. The
city was surrounded by walls and moats, with city gates on both canals and land. Broad
canals intersected throughout Suzhou for convenient transport. 8 Buildings were
constructed on the banks of canals. Suzhou gradually became an important city as the
9economy of Southern China grew rapidly .
Figure 2: Traditional waterscape: "small
bridges over flowing streams with
residences on canal banks" ( Art of
Water Color. the People's Art Press,
1989)
7 Songshan Wei. Exploration of Lake Tai Basin. Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Press, 1993
8 Suzhou Chronicle. Jiangsu People's Press. 1995
9 Xuemeng Zheng. Study on the Southward Shift of Economic Focus in Ancient Time and Jiangnan
Economy in Tang and Song Dynasty. Changsha: Yuelu Publishing House, 1996
During the Song Dynasty, Suzhou's waterscape was further enhanced with canals and
structures. The Pingjiang Plan, a map of Suzhou, described the traditional image of
Suzhou's waterscape (Figure 2). The checkerboard pattern of canals and streets had been
firmly established. 10 In the northern residential area, the canal network was dense.
Residences were situated on canal banks and many small bridges were installed. On the
south side of the city mansions of feudal government officials were located (Figure 3).
During the Ming (1368 to 1644)
and Qing Dynasties (1644 to
1911), economic prosperity
brought a commercial character
to the waterscape. In the
painting "Shengshi zisheng tu",
the blooming commercial
waterscape of the Qing Dynasty
4 was elaborately portrayed. This
period was the climax of
waterscape development in
Suzhou (Figure 4).
Figure 3: Pingjiang Plan displaying Suzhou's waterscape in the Song Dynasty
(960-1279 AD) (Xu, Yinong. The Chinese City in Space and Time.
Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000)
10 Qiming Wu. Poetry about Suzhou. Suzhou: Suzhou University press. 1999
Figure 4: the painting of "Shengshi zisheng tu" portraying
blooming commercial waterscape of the Qing Dynasty
(Shengshi Zisheng Painting)
After the Qing Dynasty the waterscape declined. After 1949, governors embraced
industrialization and modernization. As a result, the waterscapes were largely ruined."
Some canals were filled in to build wide roads. Fortunately, portions of Suzhou's
waterscape have survived and serve as a reminder of Suzhou's resplendent past.
2.2 Elements of Suzhou's waterscape to be conserved
Suzhou's waterscape can be broken down into individual elements of study. Three
elements of Suzhou's waterscape should be conserved.
2.2.1 The canal network system and water quality
Suzhou's canal network system is the backbone of its waterscape. Without the backbone,
the physical elements such as bridges and piers attached to canals would disappear. The
canal system inside the city can be divided into two categories. One category is the
arterial canal system, which consists of "3 horizontal stroke and 3 vertical stroke" canals
" Yongjian Zhang. "The Demolishment and Conservation of City Wall in Suzhou". Suzhou Journal. 1999,
63 (2): 45-48
(Figure 5). The other is the branch canal system, which links the arterial canals. Huge
numbers of households are located along the branch canal system. The spatial layout of
the city follows the canal system.1 2
Figure 5: Canal system in inner Suzhou (Chang, Pinghung. A Strategy of
Memory: Suzhou, China. Master Thesis at MIT, 1995)
The water quality in the canals is
another consideration in
conserving elements of Suzhou's
waterscape. Good water quality
can stimulate the revitalization of
Suzhou for a number of reasons.
One reason is that people by
nature prefer to live near clean
water and therefore property
value surrounding the canals
would increase. Another factor is
that clean water will attract more
investment from the private
sector. Furthermore, improving
and maintaining the water
quality will enhance living
conditions in the historic
neighborhoods of Suzhou.
1 Suzhou Urban and Rural Construction Bureau: Canal Changes in Suzhou and its Impact on Urban
Environment. 1985
2.2.2 The built elements of Suzhou's waterscape
The built elements of canals include buildings, bridges, pagodas, archways, wells, banks,
piers (Figures 6, 7, 8). Traditional dwellings, tranquil hutongs with black tiles above
white walls are components of
traditional waterscape that should be
conserved. 13
Figure 6: A historic courtyard residence (Chang,
Pinghung. A Strategy of Memory: Suzhou,
China. Master Thesis at MIT, 1995)
Figure 7: Bridges over flowing canals. (Ruan, Yisan. Old
Towns in Jiangnan. Shanghai: Shanghai Pictorial
Press, 1988)
Yisan Ruan: Jiangnan Waterfront Cities in China. Shanghai: Tongji University Press, 1995
Figure 8: Hutongs (Ruan, Yisan. Old Towns in Jiangnan. Shanghai: Shanghai Pictorial Press, 1988)
2.2.3 Civic life in the canal neighborhoods
The canals have served as active public space for local residents. The hub of intersecting
canals usually becomes a "living room" in which people chat with neighbors while
appreciating the scenery. Others exercise along the canal with companions or have a sip
of hot tea in teahouse while enjoying traditional folk music performed by a local group.
Housewives do laundry along the canals, which is also an occasion for conversations with
neighbors. Children play around stone bridges and piers. All of these activities create a
strong social network which is important in establishing a sustainable neighborhood and
promoting a quality of life.
2.3 Problems confronting the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape
Suzhou's waterscape has had a splendid past. In the last 20 years Suzhou's government
has undertaken considerable effort to conserve the waterscape. Compared to conservation
work in the other historic canal cities, Suzhou's waterscape may be the better conserved
in China. However, many problems have emerged in the conservation of Suzhou's
waterscape.
2.3.1 The decaying built environment
In some culturally sensitive historic neighborhoods, the built environment is decaying.
Although some landmark structures such as temples have been preserved well, most
residences are in a poor condition and need to be renovated. These traditional residences
form the backdrop of the waterscape. To conserve these residences is the main task at
hand.
Living conditions in such neighborhoods are very poor. Too many households are
crowded into a courtyard residence. Basic infrastructure is lacking. There are no toilets in
traditional dwellings. People have to use chamber pots or public toilets. The old drainage
system, which discharges sewage directly into the canals, is still being used. The
government still has not arrived at a solution to these problems.
2.3.2 Polluted water quality of the canals
Although the government has made a considerable effort to improve water quality, the
result has not been good. Water in the canals remains polluted. This is the result of the
residents' habits. It is assumed by everyone that the canals and its water are public goods.
Therefore, everyone has a right to access them. In Suzhou it is an accepted practice for
residents to pour human waste into the canals. These habits counteract the government's
efforts to improve the water quality.
2.3.3 The lost community
In the redevelopment of less culturally sensitive neighborhoods, land use has been
changed from low-income to high-income residences or commercial use (Figure 9). Low-
income residents have been relocated to the suburbs. In these suburbs public
transportation is inconvenient. People must spend at least three hours a day commuting
from home to work. Trips to a food market or bank or post-offices are far away and
difficult to access. The educational standard of suburban schools is markedly lower than
Suzhou's schools. This
creates a disparate
distribution of
education based on
socio-economic lines.
This relocation policy
has occurred at a great
Figure 9: Demolished residences photographed by the author in 1999 in Suzhou.
social cost and has
increased inequality of
public services among people of different incomes. City centers have become a paradise
for the rich. Projects targeted to stimulate tourism have compromised the interests of
local residents. In the Fengqiao area, for example, an entire neighborhood was erased to
build a row of antique shops for tourists. All residences on that street were demolished
and the once thriving community disappeared.
2.4 Why the waterscape should be conserved
The overall objective in the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape is not only to ensure
that this historical relic be passed on to future generations but also to maintain social
equity and enhance the quality of life.
Suzhou's local culture is tied to its waterscape. Conserving the waterscape would
conserve the local cultural tradition. Suzhou's waterscape has become a distinct physical
icon of the city. In addition, conserving the waterscape would enhance aesthetics of the
city and improve the quality of life for Suzhou's residents. Lastly, conserving the
waterscape would stimulate tourism in the city which would bring significant social and
economic benefits to the city. The conservation of Suzhou's waterscape would make the
city unique and a desirable place to live.
2.5 Economic, social and political transformations in China influencing
Suzhou's waterscape.
China's economic reform has triggered economic, social and political transformations
which have affected the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape. An examination of these
transformations is necessary to understand the Suzhou's government actions.
2.5.1 Urban governance in China
China's transitional economy is characterized by a shift from a planned to a market-
oriented economy. The current economy involves the coexistence of planned and market
elements. This is the condition under which urban policies are being formulated and it
has dramatically changed the process of urban development. Whereas the central
government originally planned everything and commanded municipal governments to
fulfill planned goals, now the central government has relinquished its role in the
development process and has placed the responsibility onto municipal governments.
Legislation in 1988 essentially accorded municipal governments a new level of autonomy
by legally allowing municipal governments to lease or transfer land use rights for the first
time. At the core of these policies was the intent to stimulate local economic growth. It
was hoped that through economic incentives more efficient use of urban land would
occur. On the flip side, the central government would no longer distribute a set budget to
each municipality. Instead, it would be incumbent upon each municipal government to
generate its own budget. The premium from land leasing has become an important source
of revenue. While this shift to a transition economy has been a welcome change, some
problems are appearing in the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape.
One problem is that government policies focus more on short-term economic growth than
long-term growth. In the case of land use, the lease of land use rights has been greatly
encouraged by the government so that a clear revenue stream can be established.
However, the focus on short-term gains has caused conservation in dilapidated historic
areas to lag behind. This is because by undertaking conservation projects the government
cannot realize short-term economic gains. In fact, most conservation work has resulted in
a government deficit.
Another problem is that municipal governors abuse their power. These governors are
appointed by upper-level governors and not elected by the citizens. As a result, municipal
governors prefer large-scale projects because such projects are recognizable
1 Fulong Wu. China's Changing Urban Governance in the Transition Towards a More Market-oriented
Economy. Urban Studies, Vol. 39, No. 7, 1071-1093, 2002
achievements that upper-level governors can acknowledge. Unfortunately this prevents
funding from being spent on improving the living standard of the poor in historic
neighborhoods.
A further problem is corruption in China's government. Giving decision-making power to
municipalities absent effective supervision has led to corruption. The lack of effective
supervision has allowed prospective investors to use personal contacts to negotiate and
influence developments.
Despite the fact that governors have decision-making power, an expert consulting
committee has been established in Suzhou. The members consist of the most prestigious
professionals and experts in China and they serve as a task force for the municipal
planning bureau on important conservation issues. The group can examine the important
projects going on in Suzhou and make suggestions. But the group can only consult. It
cannot overrule the decision of the municipal government.
2.5.2 Urban land reform in China
Land use policies have affected the Suzhou government's attitude toward conservation
programs. The history of land ownership in China is quite complicated. Prior to 1949
private ownership of land existed in China. After 1949, private ownership of land was
gradually abolished and replaced with public ownership of land. Specifically, all urban
land became the property of the state, and all rural land became the property of socialist
rural collectives. Then in the mid 1980s urban land reform occurred and triggered by the
economic reform. This urban land reform led to the emergence of an urban land market in
which land-use rights in urban areas could be transferred. However, the public is still the
owner of urban land.' 5 Thus, the land in Suzhou's historic neighborhoods is currently
owned by Suzhou's government but it is very much influenced by the local land market.
In the case of conservation, the Suzhou government's attitudes towards the land in
historic neighborhoods will determine the fate of its historic neighborhoods. If the
government were to sell the land-use right of a historic neighborhood to a for-profit
developer without any conservation requirements, the historic neighborhood might be
destroyed. In contrast, prior to the reform the government did not have the right to lease
the land. As a result, historic neighborhoods were not threatened by investors.
2.5.3 Urban housing reform in China
Housing policies are also an important factor that affects the conservation of Suzhou's
waterscape. Suzhou's waterscape is largely residential and China's housing policies will
particularly impact low-income residents in historic neighborhoods. Urban housing
policies have changed significantly since 1949. Under China's socialist system employers
built and distributed housing to their employees as part of their social welfare program.
Then, in the mid 1980s, the central government carried out various experiments that
attempted to shift housing provision from employers to the market. Employees could buy
commercial housing at market prices. To address the needs of the low-income population
governments built affordable housing. However, these affordable housing units were built
in suburbs where land cost was extremely low because the suburbs were on rural land.
The government was entitled to purchase rural land from a collective by paying a price
equal to its agricultural loss. The high-income population in urban areas was encouraged
15 Qingshu Xie, A. R. Ghanbari Parsa and Barry Redding. The Emergence of the Urban Land Market in
China: Evolution, Structure, Constraints and Perspectives. Urban Studies, Vol. 39, No. 8, 1375-1398, 2002
to obtain commercial housing through the market. However, this policy geographically
segregated the rich from the poor. The poor were being moved to suburbs while the rich
moved into urban centers including redeveloped historic neighborhoods.
2.5.4 Urban planning law in China
Present urban planning law relating to conservation was enacted in 1989. This law was
drafted at a time when there was no legal land market. In addition, the law placed heavy
emphasis on the technical and scientific aspects of planning. However, it failed to
consider the legitimacy of public action. This omission of public participation has
adversely affected the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape.
2.5.5 The urban planning profession in China
Urban planning professionals in China have found it difficult to deal with the new
situation caused by China's transitional economy because their training has concentrated
on physical planning and design rather than the underlying operation of a city. Aesthetic
formalism is the dominant philosophy in urban studies. Planning professionals generally
lack an understanding of the market. Urban economics, finance, and planning processes
are rarely taught in the universities.16 As a result, these professionals fail to apply such
concepts to conservation issues in the context of a market. Some have studied such
concepts, and the demands for professionals with this knowledge remain high, but until
China incorporates these concepts into their urban planning curriculum more broadly, the
conservation of historic neighborhoods cannot advance.
16 Interview with Wei Deng, associate professor of school of architecture, Tsinghua University, March,
2003.
Chapter Three: Conservation of Suzhou's Waterscape by the
Government
Suzhou's government has carried out conservation of its waterscape since the mid 1980s
when it recognized the value of its waterscape and the need for conservation. The
conservation of Suzhou's waterscape consists of two parts. One part is the conservation
of historic neighborhoods, which were targeted by the four programs. The other part is
the conservation of the canals.
3.1 Program 1: Conservation and rehabilitation of the single traditional
residence.
The first program instituted in the 1980s focused only on the conservation and renovation
of single traditional residences. 50 Shizi Street residence was selected as the first pilot
project and was completed in 1989. The residence was constructed at the end of the Qing
Dynasty and occupies an area of 816 square meters. The residence consists of three
courtyards; 17 families and 55 people lived in the residence before renovation. The rent
was low and appeared to be only a formality. 50 Shizi Street was owned by the state and
rented out to employees of Surgeon Medical School. 17
The project was to be co-financed by appropriations from the government and the
working unit (Surgeon Medical School) so no profit was realized. After the work was
completed, the fagade and the courtyard space were returned to the traditional style of the
17 Weizu Qu, jiajun Jin and Yisan Fang. Renovation Project of No.50 Shi Zi Jie Street in Suzhou, China's
City Planning Review, 1991.
Qing Dynasty. Inside the residence, each unit had its own bathroom and kitchen.
1 wooden Floor 2 Concrete Floor
Figure 10: Section of residence before and after renovation. (Weizu Qu, jiajun Jin and Yisan Fang. Renovation
Project of No.50 Shi ZiJie Street in Suzhou, Beijing: China's City Planning Review, 1991.)
The water and drainage systems were reconfigured and all the electrical facilities were
upgraded. In addition, none of the original residents were relocated. In this situation, the
physical "shell" of 50 Shizi Street Residence
was successfully
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conserved while
significantly improving the living condition
of all its residents (Figures 10, 11, and 12)
Figure 11: Plan before and after renovation (Weizu Qu,
jiajun Jin and Yisan Fang. Renovation Project of
No.50 Shi ZiJie Street in Suzhou,
Beijing:China's City Planning Review, 1991.)
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The practice has since been applied to 275
Shiquan Street Residence, 144 Ganjiang
Street Residence and 480 Shantang Street
Residence. However, Suzhou's government discontinued the program because the level
of conservation and rehabilitation necessary for such traditional residences proved to be
too time-consuming. The main shortcoming of this policy was that for the large amount
of time spent on conservation, only a relatively small proportion of residents experienced
an improvement in their living conditions.
Figure 12: Courtyard before and after
renovation (Weizu Qu, jiajun Jm and
Yisan Fang. Renovation Project of
No.50 Shi ZiJie Street in Suzhou,
Beijing: China's City Planning Review,
1991.)
3.2 Program 2: Conservation and redevelopment of Tongfang Neighborhood
After discontinuation of the above conservation program, the Suzhou government
implemented a new program that applied conservation and rehabilitation to an entire
historic neighborhood rather than specific residences. The Tongfang Neighborhood was
the representative project in this program.
Residential land L2
Commercial land
Industrial Land
Figure 13: Existing Conditions of Tongfang Neighborhood (Yesheng Sun, Qiuxia
Gong and Chi Luo. Renovation of Tongfang Neighborhood, Beijing:China's City
Planning Review, 1997)
The Tongfang Neighborhood covers an area of 3.8 hectares with a population of 1,811 in
600 households. The neighborhood is situated in the northeast corner of Suzhou and in
the vicinity of two famous gardens. 19
Suzhou's government carried out the conservation and redevelopment of the Tongfang
neighborhood as a non-profit project in which historic residences were largely conserved
and rehabbed. The project was initiated in 1992 and completed in 1996. New housing
18 http://www.szjs.net
19 Yesheng Sun, Qiuxia Gong and Chi Luo. Renovation of Tongfang Neighborhood, Beijing: China's City
Planning Review, 1997.
was inserted into the traditional architecture of the neighborhood. The ratio of floor area
redeveloped to that conserved and rehabilitated was 6 to 4. During this time, land and
housing reform policies were introduced which enabled the Suzhou government to lease
land use rights for some parcels and construct new commercial housing on other parcels.
Often the new housing involved complete demolition of dilapidated residences (Figure
13, 14, and 15).
The money received from leasing land use rights and new commercial housing became
an important revenue stream for the government. The government applied a portion of the
revenue to build and relocate residents to low-income housing in suburbs outside Suzhou.
The government targeted the low-income population to move to these suburbs because
the relocation cost was substantially lower. The revenue received from land use leasing
and new commercial housing was
IL also used to cover the cost of
conservation, rehabilitation, and
RedeILa~d E-- infrastructure upgrades in
Suzhou's historic neighborhoods.
In the end the net cost of new
construction, relocation,
Figure 14: Proposed land use of Tongfang Neighborhood (Yesheng Sun, rehabilitation, and conservation
Qiuxia Gong and Chi Luo. Renovation of Tongfang Neighborhood,
Beijing:China's City Planning Review, 1997) was zero. It may be argued that
the Suzhou government was able
to entirely bypass the financial cost of conservation and rehabilitation of the Tongfang
neighborhood. However, the social cost was huge. Only one third of the original residents
in the historic neighborhood could afford to move back because prices for the new
commercial residences were at market prices.
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Figure 15: Conservation Plan of Tongfang Neighborhood(Yesheng Sun, Qiuxia Gong and Chi
Luo. Renovation of Tongfang Neighborhood, Beijing:China's City Planning Review, 1997)
3.3 Program 3: A typical and widely implemented program of conservation
and redevelopment in Suzhou's historic neighborhoods
Based on the experiences and lessons of Program 2, a third program was created.
Program 3 is a typical example of conservation and redevelopment of Suzhou's historic
neighborhoods. One distinct element of Program 3 is the conservation of canal space
which was not addressed in Programs 1 and 2. Another important distinction is that on-
site relocation occurred during implementation. This was instituted based on the lessons
learned from Program 2.
In 1995 the first 3 neighborhoods were selected for Program 3 - Neighborhoods 10, 16
and 3720 21 Officials from various departments of the municipal government were
grouped into a team. The
Figure 16: Conservation Plan of Neighborhood 37 (Zukang Lu, Bingjun Xiang.
Exploration in conservation of Suzhou's historic neighborhoods. Urban Planning team included officials from
Forum, volume 120,1999)
the urban construction
bureau, the economic
planning bureau, the urban
planning bureau, the land
Consed Arhitecftm bureau and the historic and
h Inustria and Working
PMOM Renovated Residence
relic bureau. The mayor
served as the team leader
and managed the entire
process. The project was
implemented by the Urban
Construction and
Investment Company
(UCIC), a non-profit
government corporation. UCIC was owned by Suzhou's government and controlled by
the team. The projects were co-financed by banks and Suzhou's government. The
government facilitated the bank loan process for UCIC. Government funding typically
20 In Suzhou, historic neighborhoods are identified and numbered from 1 to 54.
2 Zukang Lu, Bingjun Xiang. Exploration in conservation of Suzhou's historic neighborhoods. Urban
Planning Forum, volume 120,1999.
came from Suzhou's water conservancy bureau, urban construction bureau, historic and
relic bureau, culture bureau and gardening bureau. Additionally, the revenue received
from leasing land use rights and selling commercial housing was applied to UCIC
projects (Figures 16 and 17)
Conservation took priority over
rehabilitation in the UCIC projects.
The focus was on conserving the
overall physical structure of the
neighborhoods. The structures
included the canal systems, specific
1{7-" landmarks, and historic residences. Of
the housing projects undertaken, the
majority was completely new and
designated as affordable. This
affordability factor enabled a
significantly higher proportion,
83.3%, of local residents to move
back to their historic neighborhood. In
addition, the average residential unit
Figure 17: Conservation Plan of Neighborhood 10 (Zukang Lu, size per occupant rose from 15.4
Bingjun Xiang. Exploration in conservation of Suzhou's historic
neighborhoods. Urban Planning Forum, volume 120,1999) square meters to 25.1 square meters
across all three neighborhoods. Quality
22 Interview with Jianbin Zhou, Suzhou Urban Planning Bureau, 2003.
of life for the residents improved further with the construction of new elementary
schools, kindergartens, and senior clubs.
3.4 Program 4: Current program
In recent years more investors have become interested in Suzhou's conservation and
redevelopment projects. As a result, Suzhou's government would like to pass along its
conservation projects to interested investors by leasing its land use rights in historic
neighborhoods to them. The government would then regulate the investors' performance
according to formalized conservation standards.
Currently the Suzhou government is developing a program that would link private
investors to conservation projects in its historic neighborhoods. The program would begin
with the government formally designating specific historic neighborhoods that require
conservation work. Then the government would commission a design firm to produce an
urban design plan that would fulfill the conservation requirements set by the government.
The government would prepare the site according to the urban design plan. Preparation
would include site engineering such as site grading and infrastructure upgrades. Land use
adjustments such as the relocation of factories would also take place. In the case of
relocation, the government would directly compensate the relocated party for moving
costs. After site preparation is completed, the government would then begin a bidding
process in which private investors would make offers for the leasing of the land use rights
23
of the site. It is likely that the developer with the highest offer get to develop on the site23
The developer would have to agree to abide by the regulations attached to the site.
Regulations would include FAR and height limits, design guidelines, and a maximum
23 From personal communication with a Suzhou official working on the policy.
percentage of tenants who could be relocated. In addition, the developer is financially
responsible for the whole of the project. If resident relocation were necessary, the
developer would be required to compensate the relocated party. The Suzhou government
could also offer incentives to the developer. One incentive might be supplementary land
provisions. The government would be willing to provide, at virtually no cost, the raw
land needed for developers to build affordable housing. Another incentive would involve
land use rights whereby commercial use would be permitted in portions of a developer's
design plan. Presumably, this would enable a developer to realize higher profits in the
long-term.
3.5 Canal environment improvements
Suzhou's government established the Canal Environment Department (CED) in 1995 to
improve the canal environment since canal issues are also essential part of conservation
and rehabilitation of historic neighborhoods. The task of CED is to improve the water
quality in the canals, to maintain the canal system, and to conserve and rehabilitate the
physical canal elements such as bridges and piers.
Improving water quality is the most difficult job for CED. Township enterprises in
villages or small towns have polluted surrounding lakes and rivers that flow into
Suzhou's canals. CED tried to mitigate the situation by building dikes to separate the
inner canals from the outer canals. In addition pumps have been used to circulate water so
as to prevent water stagnation and sewage farms have been built to purify canal water.
Furthermore, water from unpolluted rivers is being pumped into Suzhou's canals. Lastly,
pollution-producing factories have been relocated to the suburbs. Moreover, each year
CED uncovers canals that had been filled in and builds and repairs physical canal
elements. CED is funded by Suzhou's government and banks. In 1999, CED received
grants from the World Bank.
Interview with Yongsan Ruan, director of Canal Environment Department, 1999.
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Chapter Four: An Evaluation of Government Tools in the
Conservation of Suzhou's Waterscape
Conservation in western market-based economies has been carried out more successfully
than in China. Generally market-based economies have had a longer history of
conservation in their cities and therefore have had more time to learn from their lessons
and build a formal framework for conservation. This difference in experience may
account for the level of success in conservation between western market-based
economies and China's transitional economy. Presumably each experience helps inform
the government of what elements of a program do and do not work in conservation. Over
time, government tools may be formed and formalized to more effectively carry out the
conservation projects. This fundamental difference in approach and tools may account for
level of success between the two economies. Whereas western market-based economies
have instituted formal frameworks and government tools to address the myriad issues that
may surface from any given conservation projects, China's efforts have been piecemeal
and lack an altogether formal approach. With this in mind, it is reasonable to assert that
the adoption of formal government tools may help China better carry out its conservation
projects.
A literature search of the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape indicates that formal
government tools are being applied unsystematically. In fact, the Suzhou government
appears to be unaware that such tools exist and, therefore, lacks a formal assessment of
the tools' effects. This situation has led to inconsistent outcomes and hinders the progress
of future projects. Systematic application of tools and scientific assessment of results are
integral to developing an effective and efficient program of conservation of Suzhou's
waterscape.
4.1 Defining government tools
A government tools approach to the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape is important
and necessary in the current economic climate. Such an approach can help Suzhou's
government accommodate the wide variety of actors and interests emerging in its
transitional economy, particularly the growing private sector. This new approach could
also provide a framework on which the government could draw when new obstacles arise
from its transitional economy. This could better prepare the Suzhou government for the
future than if it were to rely solely on a traditional approach to government. A
government tools approach can help officials understand the complexities of a new
system of government and subsequently better match future policies with the appropriate
tools for further conservation work in Suzhou.
A literature review of government tools for conservation reveals that Schuster and De
Monchaux's "five tools approach" provides one systematic framework that may fit
Suzhou's situation. The approach is based on the assumption that each state holds a set of
five generic tools that can illuminate new ways to approach conservation and strengthen
government policies and actions. This thesis applies the "five tools approach" to the
Suzhou context. The five tools are ordered below from the highest to the lowest degree of
government intervention:
0 Ownership and Operation
2 j. Mark Schuster with John de Monchaux and Charles A. Riley II, ed, Preserving the Built Heritage.
Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1997.
e Regulation
" Incentives
* Establishment, allocation and enforcement of property rights
" Information
In Ownership and operation the government chooses to implement policies through
direct provision of heritage resources. These resources are owned and operated by the
government. Regulation allows the government to regulate the actions of private
individuals or institutions that own and occupy heritage resources. In the case of
incentives (and disincentives) the government provides incentives or disincentives to
draw nongovernmental actors into utilizing heritage resources in accordance with a
desired policy. Establishment, allocation, and enforcement of property rights
involves a government directive to establish, allocate, and enforce property rights of
individual parties as these affect the conservation and use of heritage resources.
Information is the collection and distribution of information carried out by the
government and with the intention of influencing the actions of those who may be
engaged in the conservation or use of the built heritage.
Each tool would send a particular message if governments adopted it as part of any
program of action. Paying attention to the implicit message being sent by governments
through each of the generic tools seems particularly important to understand the tools.
These fundamental messages might be characterized as follows:
Ownership and Operation: " The state will do X."
Regulation: " You must (or must not) do X."
"If you do X, the state will do Y."
Property rights: "You have a right to do X, and the state will enforce
that right"
Information: "You should do X, " or "You need to know Y in order
to do X"
Typically these five tools are used in combination to achieve the best results for particular
circumstances. These five tools are the fundamental building blocks with which the
government implements any policy26
4.2 Evaluation criteria
Salamon's five criteria for the evaluation of government tools 27 can be applied to the
"five tools" and appear to be the most comprehensive and appropriate to the Suzhou
context. The five criteria are effectiveness, efficiency, equity, implementability,
legitimacy of public action.
Effectiveness:
Effectiveness is the most basic criterion for gauging the success of implementation. It
essentially measures the extent to which a conservation project achieves its intended
objectives. Although cost is a consideration that can enter into one's judgment,
effectiveness judgments are typically made independent of costs.
26 J. Mark Schuster with John de Monchaux and Charles A. Riley II, ed, Preserving the Built Heritage.
Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1997.
27 Lester Salamon, ed. The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Incentives:
Efficiency:
Whereas effectiveness focuses exclusively on results, efficiency balances results against
costs. In this case, the most efficient government tool may not be the most effective one
and vice verse. Rather, an efficient tool achieves the optimum balance between benefits
and costs. The costs should include both the conservation cost in reaching an objective
and the social cost incurred by its implementation. Although some projects cost little for
a government, the cost to other involved parties or the social cost might be huge.
Equity
A third crucial criterion in terms of which consequences of tools can be judged is equity.
Equity involves basic fairness-the distribution of benefits and costs more or less evenly
across all those eligible. In the implementation process, the degree to which benefits and
costs are distributed is a measure of equity and fairness.
Implementability
Implementability refers to the level of ease or difficulty involved in the implementation
process. If the tool is more complex and convoluted, the project may be more difficult to
implement. The more actors that are involved, the more difficult a project is to
implement. Some tools are more cumbersome to operate than others. While a
combination of tools may promise great efficiency and effectiveness in theory, it may not
deliver in practice because of unforeseen administrative challenges. To implement a
project well, it is important to establish a proper institutional and legal structure wherein
tools are implementable.
Legitimacy of public action
The choice of tools can affect the public's perception that there is legitimacy in the public
action. The extent of citizen participation is an indicator of the degree of legitimacy of
public action.
4.3 Identification of government tools applied in Suzhou
Suzhou's four conservation programs have utilized two main government tools:
ownership and operation and regulation. In some cases a government corporation was
created to exercise ownership and operation.
4.3.1 Government tools used in Program 1 (50 Shizi Street)
In the case of 50 Shizi Street, ownership and operation was the only tool utilized. The
Suzhou government carried out the implementation work directly rather than through a
third party. Since the government owned the historic residences, there were no
acquisition costs. In this situation, the government was a responsible custodian of the
property and all of the residents were treated equally.
4.3.2 Government tools used in Program 2 (Tongfang Neighborhood Project)
Ownership and operation was also the only tool in the implementation of Program 2. The
government owned the built heritage. The process mainly consisted of "command" and
"control" approaches. The government commanded the local residents to move out and
controlled the process and resources. The government officials bypassed the bureaucracy
in mobilizing the resources, making the decisions, obtaining the necessary permits,
determining the terms of the projects, and employing a team of professionals.
4.3.3 Government tools used in Program 3 (Neighborhoods 10, 16, 37)
In addition to ownership and operation the Suzhou government created its own
corporation in Program 3. A government corporation occupied an organizational space
between the municipal government and the private market. This allowed the government
to exercise the tool of ownership and operation more fully. Suzhou's government
corporation organized the subcontracts for the projects. In this manner, the Suzhou
government owns and controls its corporation which was chartered to serve a public
purpose.
4.3.4 Government tools used in Program 4 (Current Program Design)
Suzhou's current conservation program is still being fashioned by the government. It
appears to incorporate ownership and operation, regulation, and incentives in the "five
tools approach". Though, regulation is the main tool applied.
Ownership and Operation Regulation Incentives property rights Information
Program i
50 Shizi Street
Program 2
Tongfang Neighborhood Project
Program 3
Neighborhoods 10, 16, 37
Program 4
Current Program Design +_+
canal improvements
Table 1: Government tools identified in Suzhou's conservation programs
0: The main tool applied
: The auxiliary tool applied
In this program, the Suzhou government applies ownership and operation on a much
smaller scale than before. The government's jurisdiction is limited to ownership of the
land and leasing land use rights to developers. Unlike previous programs, the government
will not operate the process directly nor does it plan to intervene in the market in the
same manner as in the past. Instead, the government will focus its role on regulation. The
government intends to regulate conservation process and enforcement of standards
through hefty penalties.
The government will provide select incentives such as allocation of low-cost land to
developers to encourage conservation projects by the private sector. The use of this tool
is still in their infant stages.
4.3.5 Government tools used in canal improvements
Suzhou's canal improvement program was similar to Program 1 in that only ownership
and operation was utilized. Suzhou's Canal Environment Department (CED) directly
implemented the projects (figure 18).
4.4 Evaluation of programs from tool perspective
This section evaluates how Suzhou's four conservation programs have affected the
conservation and redevelopment of the city's historic neighborhoods. The programs will
be assessed according to Salomon's criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, equity,
implementability, and legitimacy of public action. The outcome of each program will be
qualitatively evaluated according to the aforementioned criteria and comparisons will be
drawn to determine the success of one program relative to the others. A quantitative
assessment cannot be calculated using the above criteria because there is no quantitative
data available. It is possible to determine, for example, that Program 1 has been more
effective than Program 2 but it is impossible to assign a value to ascertain how much
exactly Program 1 is more effective than Program 2.
Effectiveness
Programs 1, 2 and 3 were more effective than Program 4 because the Suzhou government
owned and operated the first three projects. In addition, China's past socialist society
created a solid institutional and cultural foundation for direct control of resources. The
ownership and operation is effectively applied in the hierarchic government structure
formed in the socialist society. Furthermore, the governor of Suzhou had significantly
impacted projects in the first three programs by freely exercising his decision-making
authority. In contrast, the conservation projects in Program 4 have been implemented by
private investors who are bound by strict government regulations. This conservation
program has relied on regulation and the involvement of non-governmental forces such as
the private sector. While the government has had a role in the process, it is only indirectly
through the formulation and enforcement of the regulations. Possible corruption in the
Suzhou government might adversely affect the effectiveness of regulation and diminish
the government's capacity to ensure compliance. In this respect, corruption might affect
Program 4 much more than the other three programs. After all, it has only been in
Program 4 that the private sector has been allowed in the world of conservation and it is
the private sector that more likely has the resources to bribe government officials.
Therefore, Program 4 has proven to be less effective than the other three programs.
Efficiency
Evaluating the program efficiency is complicated because it is difficult to calculate total
cost which is the sum of the direct costs plus the social costs resulting from a project.
With respect to direct costs, Program 4 was more efficient than the other programs for a
number of reasons. One explanation is that the implementation of new regulations in
Program 4 appears to incur small to almost no additional cost over the existing operating
budget of the Suzhou government. In regulation, the administrative cost of formulating,
monitoring, and enforcing standards is internalized in the salaries of already employed
government officials. No additional employees need to be hired and the average salaries
of government employees are fairly low.
In contrast, the government incurred sizable costs in Programs 1, 2 and 3 because it
owned and operated the historic neighborhoods. The opportunity costs have been fairly
high. Between Programs 1, 2 and 3, the direct costs in Programs 2 and 3 were lower than
Program 1 because the government received revenue from leasing land use rights and
allowing construction of market-rate housing and commercial space. The direct costs of
Program 2 were lower than Program 3 because the government did not build any on-site
affordable housing in Program 2 which increased government net revenue. In sum, the
level of efficiency with respect to direct costs was highest in Program 4 and then
decreased from Programs 2 to 3 to 1.
The social costs for each program paint a different picture of efficiency. Undoubtedly the
social costs were highest in Program 2 because the social network of the neighborhoods
was completely broken by relocation. The social costs in Program 1 were lowest because
no one was relocated. Program 4 has had a higher social cost than Program 3 because the
interests of low-income residents are being addressed and the social network will be
intact after conservation is completed in Program 3. In contrast, the interests of private
investors have been given higher consideration than the interests of low-income residents
in Program 4. With respect to social costs and efficiency, Program 1 was the most
efficient, followed by Programs 3 then 4 to 2.
In combining both direct and social costs to determine the efficiency of total costs for
each program, it appears that Programs 3 and 4 are the most efficient while Program 2
seems to be the least efficient.
Equity
Social equity was most successfully realized in Program 1 because all the residents were
treated equally and no one was required to relocate. Each household was provided a
bathroom and kitchen. Program 3 ranked second in the equity criterion because a fairly
high portion, 85%, of residents remained in the neighborhood. The government provided
affordable housing to low-income residents by applying a percentage of the profit gained
from leasing land use rights and selling commercial space and market-rate housing to
affordable housing. Program 2 considered equity the least in that the government
appeared to have profit-driven leanings shortly after realizing that land could be a
potential profit-bearing asset. This leaves Program 4 as the third most socially equitable
conservation program in Suzhou. Program 4 was largely carried out through regulation
which balanced the interests of private investors and the residents. Overall Program 1
realized the highest level of equity followed by, in order, Programs 3, 4, 2.
Implementability
Program 1 was the most easily implementable because at the time China's land and
housing reforms had not yet occurred. The market was not a force with which the
government needed to consider. Program 2 was less easily implementable than Program 1
because many government agencies were involved and the government needed to balance
emerging market forces with a command-oriented public finance structure. Program 3
was more difficult than Program 2 because a semi-public government corporation was
created and the government was one step removed from the conservation process. Yet the
government was ultimately responsible for its corporation and oversaw all of its programs
and projects. This increased the number of transactions and costs associated with it. With
increased transactions there is also an increased chance of confusion and/or error in any
given project.
Program 4 was less easily implementable than Program 3 because the government needed
to formulate regulations for private investors as well as enforce compliance of the
regulations. Conservation in Program 4 is mainly in the hands of private developers and
knowledge of the market is limited but growing across all sectors in China. Corruption is
pervasive and can complicate the conservation process and compromise the
effectiveness efficiency equity implementability legitimacy of public action
Program 1 + ++++++ ++++ ++
Program 2 + + ++++ ++
Program 3 + +++ +++ ++++ ++
Program 4 + +++ ++ +++ +
Table 2: Evaluation of four programs applied in Suzhou
Note: More stars mean more successful. Five Stars means the most successful. One star means the least successful.
legitimacy of government regulation which in turn decreases the implementability of a
project. In sum, Program 1 is the most easily implementable, followed by Programs 2
then 3 then 4.
Legitimacy of public action
In all four programs, the legitimacy of public action has been low. This is largely because
the Suzhou government has never placed priority nor explicitly stated public action to be
a goal of the government. In Programs 1, 2 and 3, the government has conducted expert
consulting group meetings to get a sense of the public's interests with partial public
consulting group meetings to get a sense of the public's interests with partial public
participation. However, the citizens of Suzhou have not viewed the meetings as a form of
public action because the experts represent only a small portion of the population. This
disconnection between the interests of the people and what the government believes their
interests to be creates a level of distrust between the people and government. In sum
Programs 1, 2 and 3 score low on the legitimacy of public action criterion. Program 4
scores even lower because in addition to the shortcomings mentioned in Programs 1, 2,
and 3, the law and rules specific to the Program 4 are shaped by developers' interest and
do not involve public input. When the public is not aware of its right to participate in the
formulation of laws and the conservation process there is no basis for the legitimacy of
public action.
After an examination of government tools and criteria in the context of Suzhou, it is clear
that the legitimacy of public action rates low among all four programs. This reiterates that
the government does not yet recognize the value of public participation. This could be a
major obstacle in developing a sustainable conservation program in Suzhou. In addition,
equity has been inconsistent across the four programs. It appears that equity is a function
of market forces being imposed on the government and at times the government has lost
sight of its goal to ensure equity. Meanwhile, efficiency has consistently ranked low
across the programs because of the government's failure to factor social costs in the total
cost of each program. It is important to bear these three criteria in mind in building more
successful conservation programs for Suzhou.
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Chapter Five: Evaluation of Possible Future Government Tools in
the Conservation of Suzhou's Waterscape
The analysis conducted in Chapter Four points to ownership and operation as the
overwhelming government tool used in the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape. Only
recently has regulation been utilized. Other than these two tools, the combination of
government tools in China is limited compared to the combination of tools used in
modem western economies. The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, the issues that
have prevented other government tools such as incentives and property rights from being
applied in Suzhou will be examined. Second, new programs consisting of different
combinations of government tools will be recommended for the conservation of Suzhou's
waterscape.
5.1 Constraints on availability of government tools in Suzhou's waterscape
There are powerful factors affecting the availability of various tools. Schuster puts
forward three main factors: economic constraints, political constraints and structural
constraints.2 Given China's urban planning curriculum a fourth constraint, professional
personnel constraints, may be added.
5.1.1 Economic constraints
The application of government tools can be costly. Even a strategy that relies primarily
on information has costs associated with it. The scarcity of funds limits the outcome of
the government tools and hinders the availability of some government tools.
28 J. Mark Schuster with John de Monchaux and Charles A. Riley II, ed, Preserving the Built Heritage.
Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1997.
Economic constraints exert pressure on ownership and operation in Suzhou for several
reasons. One reason is that the government does not have enough funding to conserve
and renovate the historic heritage. Another reason is that the government has opportunity
costs associated with its ownership of the built heritage. In Suzhou, economic constraints
also affect incentives. The government cannot provide direct incentives such as grants to
investors if it is operating under a very strict budget. In addition, insufficient conservation
funding hinders the involvement of non-government organizations and non-profit
organizations such as a national trust or a conservation society. Such bodies are essential
elements of successful conservation projects in western economies because they would
be committed to addressing ancillary issues associated with conservation.
Regulation would not face much economic constraints because it appears to be cost-free
and simply requires someone to do something. Property rights would not be affected
much by economic constraints as well because the government owns the property and
assigning property rights to private individuals does not require additional funding. The
tool of information may not be affected much because it is the cheapest for government.
Why are there economic constraints in Suzhou? Why does the Suzhou government have
insufficient funds to implement conservation projects? One reason is that the Suzhou
government does not receive enough funds from the central government. The total
available conservation funding for the whole country per year is only 3.8 million dollars.
This amount is allocated to only ten different historical neighborhoods per annum.
Another reason is that China's municipal governments cannot rely on a tax system
riddled with corruption. In particular, members of the private sector commonly establish
informal arrangements with specific government officials. These arrangements enable
private entities to establish a duplicate account that reports only a portion of their profits
to the government. Government officials may conveniently overlook this situation as a
personal favor for a relatively minimal price. Although there is no documentation that
confirms this phenomenon, it is so widespread that members of the private sector believe
it is more cost-effective to play the odds of incurring heavy penalties than reporting
actual profits. Because the government cannot identify all such cases, they do not collect
the appropriate taxes from private enterprises. This may be the case in Suzhou. A third
reason for the lack of conservation resources is that conservation falls outside
development and infrastructure29 designation to which the majority of development
funding is directed.
However, these economic constraints may be overcome in several ways. One suggestion
is to apply a fixed percentage of the money collected from leasing land use rights to
conservation projects. A second suggestion is to direct resources towards eliminating
corruption in the government so that an effective tax system can be established. Then the
government could institute additional taxes on conservation-related industries. For
example, new taxes could be levied on tourism and hotels in historic areas because their
success largely depends on conservation of the area. A third suggestion is to direct
funding towards conservation projects from area developments that receive political
recognition and enhance the city's image.
5.1.2 Structural constraints
Structural constraints can play an important role in the choice of government tools. A
hierarchic government is a core feature of China's urban governance. China's long
29Telephone interview with Jianbin Zhou, Suzhou Urban Planning Bureau, March 2003.
history of feudalism society developed the hierarchic government structure to a mature
level. The hierarchic government structure is effective for governments to control and
command their sub-governments. However, this vertical structure has hindered
horizontal coordination between different government agencies. In addition, a strong
hierarchic structure has prevented the participation of non-governmental organizations,
non-profit organizations, and the private sector by not allowing their participation in the
conservation process. As a result, this structural constraint hinders the application of
incentives, property rights and information which requires cooperation and negotiation
instead of command and control.
Another structural constraint comes from within the government's own structure.
Different departments share responsibilities and have overlapping jurisdictions in
carrying out their work. In Suzhou, historic buildings are under the jurisdiction of both
the urban planning bureau and the historic relic bureau. Each bureau has the right to own
and regulate property and is responsible for funding the built heritage. This overlap of
power has resulted in conflicts between the two agencies both of which claim rights to
the built heritage. The overlap has also resulted in negligence when both agencies evade
their responsibility of the built heritage. To deal with this structural constraint, the
government has to rely on ownership and operation and regulation more than the other
tools. Under this arrangement, governors can reduce overlapping jurisdiction between
agencies and clarify each agency's responsibilities by exercising his/her authority. With
the other tools, the governors cannot influence the conservation process directly.
A final structural constraint on the free use of tools is the lack of clearly defined property
rights, which are necessary for most of the tools to operate well. In Suzhou, the
government must define, parcel out, and enforce property rights to establish a clear
foundation for the other tools of conservation.
5.1.3 Professional capacity constraints
A lack of human resources can constrain the choice of tools as well. As mentioned in
Chapter Two urban planning professionals in China have had difficulty dealing with
changing conditions arising from China's transitional economy. The professional
capacity constraints prevent the availability of complex tools such as incentives and
property rights from being utilized.
In order to relax this constraint, academic urban planning programs should be reformed
so that professional planners have the capacity to manage complex government tools.
Research and the development of an academic planning curriculum around indirect
government tools should be carried out. Urban planning administration should also be
expanded to train government officials about the application and effects of indirect
government tools. In addition, professionals should be familiar with the process of
facilitating collaborations between the government, non-governmental organizations, and
private investors so that conservation projects are carried out.
5.1.4 Political constraints:
Government tools may also be constrained by political forces and limit the choice of tools
used. For example, if municipal governors were to place emphasis on conservation as a
means of achieving political recognition and promoting a favorable public image rather
than protecting a valuable asset, ownership and operation and/or regulation are likely to
be the preferred tools. This is because the application of ownership and operation and/or
regulation can directly fulfill a governor's goals. The governor would have difficulties
enlisting the public to help build his/her political image.
When a government uses tools such as incentives, property rights and/or information,
citizens may not respond because they do not trust the government. This in turn limits the
effectiveness of government action. Persistent government corruption often accounts for
citizens' distrust of the government. In such cases direct government tools such as
ownership and operation and regulation would be more effective than the other tools
because the government can carry out conservation projects by its own directive or
impose and enforce regulations on private investors to do conservation.
Political ideology has had a profound impact on the choice of the tools used in China.
Ten years ago privatization was still a taboo topic. The state could not promote true
privatization of property because it would violate a basic principle that all land is public
and belongs to the people. Although the government encouraged the people to invest in
private housing, the land attached to the housing was not for sale. The exclusion of land
value in the property rights equation was a glaring omission and a barrier for property
rights to operate effectively. In China's transitional economy, the government needs to
relax some of the basic assumptions underlying its political ideology in order to effect
rapid changes in land use and ownership.
5.2 The relaxation of constraints
Relaxing economic, political, structural, and personnel constraints can provide more
effective programs for the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape than the current program
which limit the choice of government tools.
In the short run, economic and structural constraints are likely to be relaxed because it is
a logical next step in building government resources. For example, the enforcement of
severe penalties for corruption in the central government can improve the tax system and
increase funds for conservation. The central government could also reorganize the
government structure at the municipal level so as to eliminate the departmental overlap of
rights and liabilities around conservation. However, political and professional capacity
constraints cannot be relaxed in the short run. The political structure is a deep-rooted
hierarchy in which the people in power maintain a stronghold in decisions affecting their
jurisdiction. It would be difficult to change such a dynamic immediately. With respect to
professional capacity, relaxing its constraints would be a gradual process that requires an
understanding of western planning practices.
While relaxing political constraints would be the most difficult undertaking, it would
enable the central government to relax all the other constraints thoroughly. For example,
if political reform in China were to transform its governments into a democratic one, the
hierarchic structure could not exist for long because it would hinder the coordination
between the government and non-government entities. A political reform also could
transform the current governor-appointment system into a democratic election system.
The political goals of governors would change from focusing on grand short-term
accomplishments to maintaining the interests of one's constituency. In turn, this
transformation would lead to the relaxation of economic constraints. More funding would
be used to do conservation projects and enhance one's quality of life.
Unfortunately, political affairs are still a taboo topic in China. Although economic reform
has been carried out for over 20 years, political reform is still on a long waiting list.
Relaxing political constraint means challenging political interests. This would affect
current political interests because the new programs would involve democratic practices
and accountability for social equity, both of which threaten the present political climate.
Can governors willingly sacrifice their privileged authority to bestow democracy to the
people? May people express in public a need for democracy in light of China's history of
imprisoning political dissidents? China's feudal tradition has taught its people to be
reticent in political matters because the government has firmly dictated the people's
political ideology for centuries. If current political leaders do not reduce political
constraints, it may require the strength of economic forces to break through China's
current political hold on the market before political changes could occur.
5.3 The programs without constraints
This section assumes that all the constraints described earlier will be relaxed in the future.
It is hoped that the economic, political and structural environment for government tools
will be refined in the future so that new combinations of government tools can be
utilized. Each program involves a combination of different government tools and was
formulated under the belief that a combination of tools can be more successful than a
single tool when the program is dealing with a wide variety of actors such as the
government, the private sector, and nonprofit organizations. The Suzhou government
may draw from the proposed recommendations as it continues to conserve for its built
heritage.
In Suzhou, there are two typical kinds of historic neighborhoods. One type is the
culturally sensitive historic neighborhoods. Most of the physical structures cannot be
demolished because they have long histories and hold great cultural value. For example,
temples, courtyard homes of famous families, pagodas and bridges have survived over
many centuries and are vulnerable to daily wear and tear. Therefore these structures need
to be carefully conserved and repaired. Any improper, however slight, treatment of a
structure would destroy the historic value of the neighborhood. In such neighborhoods it
is the conservation and renovation of these structures that would be the main task. Large-
scale developments are not permitted and small-scale commercial developments would
be limited to further maintain the historic fabric of the neighborhoods. The percentage of
low-income population is higher than the standard neighborhood.
The other type of neighborhood is the less culturally sensitive historic neighborhoods. In
Suzhou the majority of these physical elements lacks aesthetic and historic value and
therefore can be demolished. In such neighborhoods conservation and redevelopment
would occur simultaneously. More commercial developments would be accepted in these
neighborhoods than the culturally sensitive neighborhoods.
5.3.1 Case One: The Pingjiang Neighborhood
The Pingjiang neighborhood is representative of culturally sensitive neighborhoods in
Suzhou. Pingjiang has the longest history among all the neighborhoods in Suzhou. Many
valuable historic structures remain. Traditional residences stand between one to three
stories. Famous Chinese gardens are located next to factories and working units.
Commercial developments are rare and highly restricted (Figure 18).
Pingjiang calls for programs in which ownership and operation and/or regulation are
overwhelming tool. The government must have a strong custodial role in Pingiang's
conservation. Otherwise private entities' may inadvertently destroy historic structures and
disregard the intent of conservation and destroy the collective value of the historic
neighborhood. In this respect, the historic environment could not be significantly
conserved in the absence of strict government oversight which, in turn, is most clearly
embodied in ownership and operation, and regulation. In addition, the nature of
conservation projects should be non-profit. Therefore non-profit organizations are
preferred to participate in the conservation process. According to these situations, two
conservation programs are suggested to address the conservation of the Pingjiang
neighborhood.
Program 1: Ownership and operation
+ incentives
Program 1 is the combination of
ownership and operation, and incentives.
Ownership and operation is the
overwhelming tool while incentives are
the auxiliary tool. Suzhou's
government-owned corporation would
need to be commissioned to carry out its
conservation projects so that direct
government bureaucracy is minimized.
Figure 18: The existing condition of Pingjiang Neighborhood.
(Provided by Suzhou Urban Planning Bureau, 1999) Otherwise the human resources available
to carry out conservation would be
shared between different government agencies. In addition, those assigned to undertake
conservation would be required to divide their time between different projects and duties.
Under these conditions, government-managed conservation project would not be as well
equipped to implement and address the concerns that accompany conservation projects as
well a government corporation.
Another component of this program requires that an expert consulting committee be
established. The committee would consist of citizens drawn from a cross-section of
residents in the area to be conserved, from area professionals to business representatives
to academics and concerned citizens. This committee would agree to assist the municipal
government or the government corporation in the task of undertaking conservation
projects.
Funding for conservation projects would come from the following resources:
" The government corporation would take out bank loans and make its payments
from the returns it receives from its investments. In the case of Suzhou, the
government could provide insurance to the government corporation. If the
government corporation were to default, the Suzhou government would cover the
loss.
e The government corporation would get grants from the Suzhou government to do
public works-related and/or conservation projects such as renovation of landmark
structures, infrastructure improvements, canal repairs, and affordable housing.
e The government corporation would earn money from land transactions and select
commercial development. For example, infrastructure and canal enhancements
generally increase the value of surrounding land. In turn, because the price of
leasing land use rights is a function of the land value, the government corporation
would increase its revenue with increases in the lease rate. In addition the
government corporation could sell or rent out high-income housing, commercial
and tourist space to increase its revenue.
In this ownership and operation approach the government-owned corporation is directly
engaged in conservation including conserving and renovating residences, bridges, banks,
steps, and improving the water quality of canals.
Suzhou's designation of historic architecture includes buildings on-site to be conserved
or renovated or demolished. A government-owned corporation could conserve and
rehabilitate an architectural structure by itself. Or the government could provide
incentives to residents to do some conservation work. In the latter scenario, the
government would provide funding, technical, and design assistance to a resident so that
he/she can complete the conservation work on his/her own. For example, if residents
were to renovate the historic housing they live in to meet required conservation standards
set by the government, they would pay less rent or live rent-free.
In addition, new traditional-style housing should be built in the historic neighborhoods
that undergo conservation. This approach would enable residents to be relocated to new
housing in the neighborhood and alleviate overcrowding. A large portion of the new
housing would need to be affordable for relocated low-income residents. High-income
people would be allowed only to invest in market-housing units in the neighborhood. The
funds received from the high-income residents would be used to subsidize the low-
income units. These affordable housing units could be where structures were demolished
or on former sites of working units and/or factories that were commanded to move out by
the Suzhou government.
Program 2: Ownership and operation + regulation + incentives + information
In the case where regulation is the overwhelming tool applied in Suzhou, ownership and
operation, incentives and information serve as supplemental tools. The government
would administer the process by formulating conservation goals, creating planning
guidelines, and regulating the stakeholders. The stakeholders would include non-
governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, and private individuals.
One important element in this program is that the government develops design guidelines
that aim to revitalize the waterscape and encourage sustainable development in historic
neighborhoods. The guidelines are to be designed by professional planners. The expert
consulting committee would participate in the design review so that feedback from local
citizens is incorporated in the final guidelines. Consistency in land use and conservation
goals must be maintained. Land use changes that put heritage buildings and precincts at
risk are to be eliminated. Structures and activities that could prevent conservation of
historic structure need to be minimized. A conservation designation that prohibits the
demolition of a historic structure needs to be clearly and explicitly stated in the land use
plan. Fagade standards must be included in the guidelines. Public space along canals
would be redesigned. And a minimum distribution of affordable housing in the historic
neighborhood is to be enforced.
After the guidelines are developed, the Suzhou government would prepare the site for the
implementation of a project. In preparing the site, the government could enhance existing
infrastructure and relocate polluting factories. The government could also renovate the
physical elements of a canal. For example, the government could repair old bridges and
pave a pedestrian path.
Following preparation of the site, the government would commission or lease land use
rights of a site to non-profit or non-governmental organization. Private developers would
not be encouraged to participate in the program because the nature of the program is not
to profit which conflicts with the developers' goals. The organizations sought would
demonstrate a commitment to local issues. The commitment to local concerns and focus
on rehabilitation of historic structures are essential but unlikely to be achieved by a public
agency or private developer. Moreover, a non-profit status assures local residents that the
program's administrators are not in it for the money nor are they a part of government
bureaucracy. However, the government should still enforce the strict regulations and
supervise the entire process. Any violation of the guidelines would lead to the revocation
of implementing rights.
Besides regulation, the government would offer incentives to organizations. Incentives
could be contingent on public needs. For example, an organization could get a grant from
the government if 85 percent or more of low-income residents receive affordable housing
located right in the neighborhood. The government could facilitate public participation by
incorporating information in the form of seminars, workshops or the media to educate
and encourage people to be actively involved.
5.3.2 Case Two: Neighborhood 37.
Neighborhood 37 is representative of less culturally sensitive neighborhoods in Suzhou.
This neighborhood mentioned in Chapter Three has already been conserved and
redeveloped by the government. Now it is assumed that the conservation project could be
redone with all the constraints reduced so that incentives and property rights are also
available for use (figure 19). Operating under the above circumstances, four programs are
suggested below.
Program 1: Ownership and operation + incentives
This program is similar to Program 1 in Case 1 in that the combination of tools is the
same. However, in the second case of Program 1, more land use rights were leased and
more commercial space was permitted for development than Case 1. By carrying out
these changes, the government received more funding for conservation and subsidizing
the poor.
Program 2: Ownership and operation + regulations + incentives
Program 2 is similar to Program 2 in Case 2. The combination of tools of this program is
the same with Program 1 in Case 2. However, after the government completes the
guidelines and site preparation, the site
would be put on the market for bid as long
as the guidelines mentioned above are
strictly adhered. The highest bid would
win the project. The government would
enforce compliance and supervise the
entire process. Any violation of the
guidelines would lead to the revocation of
development rights. In addition to j
Figure 19: The existing condition of Neighborhood 37.
(Provided by Suzhou Urban Planning Bureau, 1999)
regulation, the government could offer the developer some incentives. For example, low-
cost suburban land could be provided to the developer if he/she can build additional
affordable housing in the neighborhood.
Program 3: Regulation + incentives + information
In Program 3 incentives is overwhelmingly used while regulation and information would
be auxiliary tools. The expert consulting committee mentioned in Program 1 is needed in
this program and an urban design guideline would be created by the government and the
committee. The guidelines would be less strict than in Program 2 in Case 1 and would put
forth the minimum conservation requirements. The guideline would state exactly which
renovations or new construction is allowed in neighborhood 37. These limitations are to
be based on the physical fabric of Neighborhood 37 and include though not limited to
building height, materials and color. People who wish to alter the buildings or undertake
new construction in Neighborhood 37 must go through a design review process to ensure
that the proposed change will conform to the standards established for the neighborhood
37. The expert consulting committee participates in the design review process. The
above illustrates some applications of regulation.
The government would provide incentives or disincentives to actualize the goal of
conservation. For example the government could provide grants, a type of direct
incentives, to encourage developers, nonprofit organizations, or owners of historic
properties to undertake conservation-related tasks (such as maintenance, restoration).
Another example involves private developers who agree to build a percentage affordable
housing in the neighborhood in exchange for a grant. For landowners who are willing to
restore their residence under the guidance of government-appointed professional planners
appointed by the government, they can get the grant to offset a percentage of costs.
The government could also apply indirect incentives which have a notable financial effect
with no direct transfer of money. One popular indirect incentive is called homesteading.
The government can sell dilapidated residential property to a person or family for a
nominal fee (often only $1). In return the buyer commits to rehabilitate the structure
within a given period of time and live in it for an agreed-upon period thereafter.
Homesteading recaptures old, abandoned housing and ensures its continued viability by
relying on individuals to carry out the improvements. In return, the individuals have
incentives to own and operate historic property. In this situation, both the individual and
the neighborhood benefit.
A similar indirect incentive is called shopsteading. The government offers abandoned
properties to merchants nearly for free. The merchants, in turn, agree to bring the
property up to neighborhood design guideline and operate a shop on the premises for at
least two years. Shopsteaders are encouraged to live on upper floors.30 Meanwhile, the
government would assist in design improvements, and access to rehabilitation loans from
city funds.
The government also can provide incentives for residents to renovate their own residence.
For example, if residents renovate the roof, the government would renovate the fagade for
the residents for free. Or if residents renovate their house, the residents can be allowed
not to pay rents. In addition, the government can offer incentives for private investors to
30 Enry, Lessons from Local Experience, US Department of Housing and Urban Development and
Agriculture. 1983
renovate the physical elements of a canal. For example, if developers repair bridges and
piers, the developers can get a tax deduction for their other projects in the city.
The government can offer rehabilitation loans at very low rate to encourage developers to
carry out conservation projects. The government can provide mortgage guarantees at
lower costs than commercial lenders for conservation projects.
Incentives also have to take into account disincentives. For example, if the relocation rate
of local residents does not meet the minimum requirement set by government, the
developers or organizations would be heavily fined and the minimum relocation rate
would have to be met in the end.
The government could also apply information. In particular, conservation programs
initiated by the government or non-profit organizations could provide an excellent
opportunity for training in construction skills. These programs could lower conservation
costs and provide job opportunities to unemployed low-income residents.
Program 4: Incentives + property rights + information
In Program 4 incentives and property rights will be overwhelming tools while
information would be an auxiliary tool. The application of incentives and information is
similar to Program 3 except that property rights will be added.
It is assumed that Suzhou is in the process of privatizing property and needs to create a
framework to define, enforce, and protect property rights. Since most physical structures
in Suzhou's historic canal neighborhoods belong to the State, the government must be
involved in the privatization process. When the government sells or leases public
property to a private entity, the property rights for each parcel needs to be defined by
legal documentation whereby title, development rights, conservation and other
requirements are outlined. In addition, a complete legal structure relating to property
rights should be established and validated so that property rights can be protected.
Furthermore, a competitive market needs to exist so that individuals would be willing to
exercise their property rights.
Development Rights Transfer Programs merit notice in conservation. A development
rights transfer can be severable, bankable, transferable, and attachable. It should be both
attractive to its intended participants and compatible with a municipality's conservation
requirements and urban design values. Holders of development rights could trade their
rights with each other. Developers can get a development rights transfer from a historic
neighborhood to a suburban area. This exchange is treated as an incentive. In the transfer
of development rights, negotiation replaces command and control as the preferred
approach. The stakeholders could then collaborate with each other under the guidance of
the government.
Incentives and information are usually bundled with property rights. For instance, water
quality issues have puzzled the Suzhou government for many years. The deterioration of
the water quality has adversely affected conservation in the city. The Suzhou government
has tried a number of methods to improve the water quality in the canals. However,
Suzhou's citizens continue to pollute the water. To change people's behaviors and
attitude toward the canals property rights could be assigned to those living near the
canals. The government could set a standard for water quality. After a period of time, the
water quality should be examined. If the result is worse than the water quality standard
set by the government, the citizens should compensate. If the result is better than the
standard, citizens would be given cash rewards. These policies are essentially incentives
and disincentives for citizens to voluntarily maintain a minimum level of water quality.
In sum, four constraints have prevented the availability of government tools in Suzhou.
Relaxing political constraints is the essential step to pave the way for other constraints to
be relaxed. Operating under the condition that all four constraints have been relaxed, four
programs have been proposed to address two common situations in the conservation of
Suzhou's waterscape. Each program consists of different combinations of government
tools. An examination of these programs points to a need to include more actors in order
to ensure successful conservation of Suzhou's waterscape.
Chapter Six: Conclusion
An important conclusion may be drawn after a review of how the conservation of
Suzhou's waterscape might be implemented. A new governance paradigm needs to be
created to carry out the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape. The new paradigm needs to
involve more stakeholders than before to participate and carry out a government tools
approach. The Suzhou government and a host of third-party actors such as non-profit
organizations, private investors and individuals need to depend on each other. The current
hierarchy of government agencies needs to be transformed into organizational networks
such that collaboration would replace competition and negotiation-and-persuasion would
replace command-and-control. All of these changes would reflect the government's effort
to legitimize government action under a transitional economy.
Moreover, a new governance paradigm needs to focus on a tools approach. According to
the circumstances, the government needs to formulate effective programs. Each program
has its own combination of tools and constraints. The tools approach requires a new field
of knowledge focusing on the operation of different tools and optimal conditions for their
use. Efforts to understand the tasks required in the conservation of Suzhou's waterscape
must begin not only with a clear understanding of the problem, but also an appreciation
of the characteristics of the available tools and how they work.
The new governance paradigm can be applied to historic canal cities in China's Jiangsu
and Zhejiang provinces because these cities share features and problems similar to
Suzhou. Hopefully more historic canal waterscapes will be conserved and enhanced
which will in turn preserve the cultural traditions and life attached to a waterscape.
This thesis was conceived as a starting point to institute a new government paradigm that
focuses on conservation in China's historic canal cities. However, it is only a start. Much
work lies ahead. It is hoped that the material presented here provides a useful foundation
on which to advance a formal and systematic conservation program.
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